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An inelastic tax system increases the uncertainty associated with tax 
revenue collection. This results in continuous short-term adjustments to 
maintain the stability of tax collection. In this paper, we estimate the 
revenue elasticity of the principal taxes in Mexico, finding a much greater 
elasticity than that found in previous studies. A cointegration model between 
the revenue and taxes is used which satisfies strong exogeneity, providing 
a basis for congruent and reliable projections. Using this model, the tax 
revenue projected for 2011 is much lower than the estimates prepared by 
Mexico’s federal government.
JEL clasification: C22, E62, H24.
Keywords: Federal taxes, long-term revenue elasticity, cointegration, 
strong exogeneity, forecasts
1.  Introduction
Having a tax system in which the revenue elasticity of taxes is greater 
than or equal to one is of considerable importance for public finance (see 
for example Groves and Khan, 1952). If it is elastic, tax collection evolves 
with growth in national income, reducing the uncertainty associated with 
tax revenue. If, on the contrary, the tax system is inelastic to income, 
frequent tax rate changes are required in order to maintain collection at 
steady levels in the short term (Capistrán, 1999). This has a negative 
impact on resource allocation and distribution in an economy.
Likewise, the sensitivity of tax collection to income is valuable information 
for the government, both in terms of planning and formulating public 
spending and monitoring tax collection (Kustepeli and Sapci, 2006). In 
the case of Mexico, this aspect is explicitly considered in the Revenue 
Law Initiative (Iniciativa de Ley de Ingresos, or ILIF) which Treasury 
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authorities submit to Congress each year. This means that, when 
calculating tax revenue collection, the real long-term revenue elasticity 
of each tax will be considered in addition to the macroeconomic context 
expected for the period covered by the forecast.
In this context, the main objective of this paper is to calculate the 
revenue elasticity of Mexico’s main tax revenues, which are the 
income tax (Impuesto sobre la Renta, or ISR) and the value-added tax 
(Impuesto al Valor Agregado, or IVA). Only the elasticity of these two 
taxes is studied because they account for practically all (approximately 
90%, according to information from the Treasury Secretariat) of non-
petroleum tax revenue collection. 
The results obtained from analysis of time series (i) confirm the 
existence of evidence of a long-term relationship between taxes and 
national income, and (ii) indicate that this ratio is elastic. The revenue 
elasticity obtained for the IVA is 2.03, while for the ISR the revenue 
elasticity obtained was 2.16.
Recent literature contains various calculations of such elasticities, 
in particular those performed by Cárdenas et al. (2008) and those 
of the Public Finance Research Center (Centro de Estudios de las 
Finanzas Públicas del Congreso de la Unión)
1 in 2009 (which we refer 
to as CEFP, 2009a). In comparison to those studies, this one includes 
several improvements and extensions, including the incorporation of 
the tax rate in order to control for this variable in studying the tax-
revenue relationship. 
Also notable is the use of more modern econometric tools which are 
capable of effectively controlling the presence of structural breaks and 
defining their location in an endogenous way. Likewise, Johansen’s (1988) 
methodology, the standard process in modern macro-econometrics, 
is used to calculate the relationship between the variables. Among 
the most interesting results is evidence of strong exogeneity of the 
parameter associated to the explanatory variable of the specification 
(revenue), which can be considered a useful and valid instrument for 
preparing tax-collection forecasts.
At the same time, the ability to develop forecasts based on the 
autoregressive vector with an error correction mechanism (vector error 
correction, or VEC) is verified and this is compared to the official 
forecasts provided by the Treasury Secretariat.
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This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains a brief description 
of the structure of federal revenues in Mexico, emphasizing the 
importance of the taxes examined in this paper within this structure. 
Section 3 contains an analysis of cointegration as well as a discussion 
of the econometric results obtained, the preparation of forecasts, and 
a comparison of these forecasts with the official ones. Finally, the main 
conclusions of the study are presented in Section 4.
2.  The ISR and IVA in the structure of the 
Mexican tax system
Mexico has the lowest tax collection rate among OECD countries 
(OECD, 2010). According to OECD data, the average collection rate 
among its member countries is 24.7% of GDP, but in Mexico this 
indicator is around 10%. Another important characteristic of the Mexican 
fiscal system is that it is heavily dependent on resources from taxes 
on petroleum activities, which account for one-third of total federal 
government revenue (CEFP, 2010). Table 2 shows how the structure of 
total federal government revenue has evolved as a percentage of GDP 
from 2000 to 2010, displaying the aforementioned characteristics as 
well as the particular weight of collection of total ISR
2 and IVA, with 
average values between 4-5 and 3-4% of GDP, respectively.
2. This includes, besides collection of taxes on individuals and legal entities, revenue from the Uniform 
Rate Business Tax (Impuesto Empresarial a Tasa Única, IETU) and the Tax on Cash Deposits (Impuesto 
a los Depósitos en Efectivo, IDE).
Table 1.  Federal government revenue as a percentage of GDP
(2000-2010)
Item 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total 18.5 19.2 20.4 21.2 20.7 21.1 21.9 22.0 23.5 23.7 22.6
Petroleum 6.1 5.8 6.0 7.1 7.4 7.9 8.3 7.8 8.7 7.4 7.4
Non-petroleum 12.5 13.3 14.3 14.1 13.2 13.2 13.6 14.2 14.8 16.3 15.2
Tax 8.1 8.6 9.0 9.0 8.4 8.6 9.0 9.3 9.9 9.5 10.0
- ISR total 4.1 4.3 4.7 4.5 4.0 4.2 4.3 4.7 5.1 5.0 5.2
- IVA 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.7 3.6 3.8 3.4 3.9
Total 18.5 19.2 20.4 21.2 20.7 21.1 21.9 22.0 23.5 23.7 22.6
Tax 9.2 9.9 10.7 10.1 9.0 8.8 8.6 8.9 8.2 9.5 9.6
Non-tax 9.4 9.3 9.7 11.0 11.7 12.3 13.3 13.1 15.3 14.2 13.0
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Regarding the percentage structure of total federal government revenues, 
Table 2 shows that petroleum revenues (in its various forms, rights, 
uses, etc.) have represented one-third of total revenues, as previously 
mentioned. With respect to non-petroleum revenue, in the tax category 
the overall collection of the two taxes studied represents just over half 
of the federal government’s non-petroleum revenue.
Table 2.  Percentage structure  
of total federal government revenues
(2000-2010)
Item 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Petroleum 32.7 30.4 29.6 33.3 36.0 37.3 38.0 35.4 36.9 31.0 32.9
Non-petroleum 67.3 69.6 70.4 66.7 64.0 62.7 62.0 64.6 63.1 69.0 67.1
Federal Gov. 49.5 51.6 52.6 48.5 46.5 44.7 44.8 48.5 47.5 53.5 50.4
Tax 43.7 44.7 44.4 42.4 40.5 40.7 41.1 42.1 42.2 39.9 44.4
- ISR-IETU-IDE 22.0 22.5 23.0 21.1 19.5 19.7 19.8 21.2 21.9 21.1 23.0
- IVA 16.1 16.4 15.7 15.9 16.1 16.3 16.8 16.5 16.0 14.5 17.0
- Production and services 1.3 1.8 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.0
- Imports 2.8 2.3 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.1 0.8
- Other taxes 1.6 1.7 2.0 1.9 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.5
Non-tax 5.8 7.0 8.2 6.0 6.0 4.0 3.7 6.4 5.2 13.6 6.0
Source: Treasury and Public Credit Secretariat.
Note: IDE is the Tax on Cash Deposits; IETU is the Uniform Rate Business Tax.
Therefore, observing the behavior of effective tax rates is quite relevant.
3 
Such rates reflect marginal growth as a proportion of the corresponding 
basis, which is sustained somewhat by collection efforts over the last 
20 years, but they also reveal that Mexico’s collection level is low, 
especially when compared to OECD member countries. 
On the other hand, an analysis of the tax revenue composition clearly 
shows that the total ISR and IVA together constitute almost 90% of 
revenues, while the remaining 10% is distributed between the tax on 
production and services (non-petroleum), the import tax and others 
(see Table 3).
3. Figures for the effective rates of the taxes studied here were calculated using CEFP (2009b and 
2010) and are based on the work of Antón-Sarabia (2005). As the latter study explains, the effective 
tax rate takes into consideration each collection measurement expressed as a fraction of its own basis: 
consumption for the IVA and individuals’ salaries for the ISR. It is worth noting that the effective tax 
rates cannot be considered exogenous instruments in the econometric analysis given that, due to their 
construction, they would have to be considered endogenous to the system. F.J. Fonseca and D. Ventosa-Santaulària | FEDERAl TAXES IN MEXICo
Table 3.  Percentage structure of tax revenues
(2000-2010)
Item 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
ISR total 50.2 50.3 51.7 49.6 48.2 48.5 48.1 50.3 51.9 52.9 51.7
- ISR 50.2 50.3 51.7 49.6 48.2 48.5 48.1 50.3 46.6 47.5 47.7
- IETU n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0 3.9 4.0 3.4
- IDE n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0 1.5 1.4 0.6
IVA 36.8 36.7 35.5 37.5 39.8 40.2 40.9 39.1 37.9 36.2 38.4
Production and services 3.0 4.1 3.9 4.4 4.5 4.3 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.6
Imports 6.4 5.1 4.4 4.0 4.1 3.4 3.4 3.1 3.0 2.7 1.9
Other taxes 3.7 3.8 4.5 4.5 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.2 4.0 3.4
ISR total and IVA 87.0 87.0 87.1 87.1 87.9 88.6 89.0 89.4 89.7 89.1 90.1
Source: Treasury and Public Credit Secretariat.
Note: n.a. = not applicable.
Figure 1. Tax rate of the IVA
(Quarterly series)
Source: Treasury Secretariat and authors’ calculations based on Antón-Sarabia (2005) and CEFP (2009b).
Figure 2. Tax rate of the ISR
(Annual series)
Source: Treasury Secretariat and authors’ calculations based on Antón-Sarabia (2005) and CEFP (2010). LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48, No. 1 (MAY, 2011), 89–111
3.  Time series analysis
The basic series for the analysis are collection data of the ISR 
(excluding the IDE and the IETU) and the IVA, as published on 
the web page of the Treasury Secretariat
4 and the web page of the 
National Institute for Statistics and Geography (Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística y Geografía, or INEGI),
5, which  publishes the GDP. 
Regarding the IVA, there are three special treatments (border 
rate, exempt goods and services, and zero rate) and as a result the 
nominal rate differs from the average effective rate. The same occurs 
with the ISR, which underwent a significant reform in 2001. This 
reform reduced the annual rates by one percentage point for legal 
entities, which represent a significant percentage of collection along 
with individuals (the rate used in this study). Although it would 
be convenient to use the average effective rate and not the nominal 
rate, this is not feasible for various reasons. In reference to the 
IVA, and because this study focuses on time series, such questions 
could eventually be modeled by using dummy or proxy variables. 
Nevertheless, the modeling would be too ad hoc, reducing the validity 
and interest of the model.
For the ISR, data are only available from 1993 to 2009 and solely on an 
annual basis. Its use in this study would require quarterizing the annual 
data. We consider that the available methods (e.g., Chow and Lin) produce 
a serious detriment to the statistical quality of the series and moreover, 
do not resolve the problem of obtaining the effective rate data for 2010, 
so the treatment of the IVA and the ISR would be very unequal. 
Figures 3 and 4 show how these variables have evolved in the period 
encompassing the first quarter of 1990 through the fourth quarter of 
2010, all in millions of constant pesos (base year 2003). 
The sample used in this study includes observations from 1990 to 
2010, since 1990 is the first year for which the Treasury Secretariat 
has published information on the collection of the taxes studied. In 
addition, only information from 1990 and later is taken into consideration 
in the ILIF projections. In order to ensure that the results obtained 
here are comparable with those of the Treasury Secretariat, the same 
sample period will be used.
4. Available at  http://www.apartados.hacienda.gob.mx/estadisticas_oportunas/esp/index.html
5. Available at http://dgcnesyp.inegi.org.mx/cgi-win/bdieintsi.exe/NIVA1001200010#ARBOL  F.J. Fonseca and D. Ventosa-Santaulària | FEDERAl TAXES IN MEXICo
With regard to the evolution of the variables, it is evident is that the 
collection of both taxes and the GDP follow a common trend, in the 
words of Stock and Watson (1988). Therefore in principle it can be 
conjectured from the simple graphic analysis that it would be possible 
to calculate the long-term relationships (cointegration) between them. 
This is formally proven by the tests designed for this purpose. Before 
discussing the results of the econometric analysis, it is important to 
Figure 3. ISR collection and GDP
(Millions of constant pesos, base year 2003)
 
Source: Prepared by the authors using data from INEGI and the Treasury Secretariat.
Figure 4. IVA Collection and GDP
(Millions of constant pesos, base year 2003)
Source: Prepared by the authors using data from INEGI and the Treasury Secretariat. LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48, No. 1 (MAY, 2011), 89–111
point out that the IVA and ISR series consider a one-month lag in 
collection, under the premise that the tax generated in a particular 
period is actually paid in to the Treasury the following month. Thus, 
the first quarter of the year is made up of December-January-February, 
unlike the typical classification of January-February-March, and so 
on with the other quarters.
3.1.  Series’ order of integration
A typical cointegration analysis requires that the variables to be used 
be first-order integrated. Thus, first an analysis is done of the series’ 
order of integration. The following table shows the results of different 
unit root tests applied to the logarithms of the variables in levels and 
deseasonalized.
6
Continuing with the analysis, it is worth mentioning that in the 
auxiliary equations of the ADF, KPSS, DF-GLS and Phillips-Perron 
tests, only the intercept is included. The objective is to be able to 
prove the presence of the unit root in the variables while controlling 
for the possible presence of a deterministic trend.
7 With respect 
to the presence of a structural change in the series (which could 
influence the unit root tests), the Kapetanios (2005) and Ventosa-
Santaulària and Gómez-Zaldívar (2010) (hereafter VSGZ) tests are 
also carried out. The first test is a generalization of that proposed 
by Zivot and Andrews (1992); under the null hypothesis, the variable 
behaves like a unit root while under the alternative, it behaves like 
a trend stationary process with up to 5 structural breaks. This test 
does not take into account the possibility of structural breaks under 
H0, so we apply the VSGZ test, which is precisely based on the 
evidence of unit root and draws inference about the presence of a 
drift and a possible break in it.
8 What is sought is the best possible 
characterization of the series and to obtain broad and abundant 
evidence of the stochastic trends. 
As can be seen in Table 4, the results obtained show clear evidence of 
the existence of a unit root. This is supported by the Kapetanios test, 
6. The series were seasonally adjusted using the X12 ARIMA package. 
7. This is because when evidence is not found to reject the unit root null hypothesis, said intercept becomes 
a linear deterministic trend. In that case (that is, under the null hypothesis), including a deterministic 
trend in addition to the intercept implies the existence of a quadratic deterministic trend.
8. The number of lags in all the tests (in order to control for autocorrelation and thus prevent distor-
tions in their levels) was determined based on the Schwarz information criterion. F.J. Fonseca and D. Ventosa-Santaulària | FEDERAl TAXES IN MEXICo
which contemplates up to two possible breaks. Likewise, the VSGZ 
test indicates that only the ISR has no trend, unlike the GDP and the 
IVA; nevertheless, neither of the latter two experiences a break in this 
trend. In any case, the tests indicate that the three series of interest 
(IVA, ISR and GDP) have a unit root. Once the order of integration of 
the variables is verified, we proceed to address the modeling strategy 
to be used for the calculations.
Table 4.  Results of applying the unit root tests
Variable test GDP IVA ISR
ADF -1.07† -0.16† -0.98†
KPSS 1.13† 1.07† 1.15†
GF-GSL 1.09† -0.13† -0.16†
Phillips-Perron -1.18† -0.31† -0.87†
Tests with endogenous structural break
Kapetaniosa (2005) -4.99† -5.49† -5.43†
VSGZb (2010)







(search for breaks 
not applicable)
† indicates that the unit root hypothesis cannot be ruled out at 1% significance. 
*** and ** indicate that Ho is ruled out at 1% and 5%, respectively. 
a. Number of maximum lags, 8; trimming, 6; number of breaks, 2. 
b. Trimming, 8.
3.2.  Modeling strategy
To calculate the long-term relationship between the variables, first the 
hypothesis of a cointegration vector with structural break is proven 
with the Gregory and Hansen test (1996), hereafter called GH. This is 
done in order to correctly specify said relationship. This test enables 
one to discard or consider that the cointegration ratio is stable or 
experiences structural breaks throughout the sample period studied.
9 
The GH test is an extension of the Engle and Granger (1987) test and 
is designed to identify a possible structural break in the cointegration 
relationship between two or more variables. Table 5 shows the result 
of applying the GH test to the long-run equations.
9. Under the null hypothesis of this test, non cointegration is assumed given the alternative, which is that the 
variables have a long-term relationship subject to a break. This break is determined endogenously. LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48, No. 1 (MAY, 2011), 89–111
As can be seen, the null hypothesis of non-cointegration is not ruled 
out in any of the three specifications considered by GH. Thus we 
proceed to prove the existence of a cointegration relationship between 
the variables without breaks, based on the Johansen test.
10 This test 
includes under the null hypothesis a cointegration vector between 
the revenue and the tax and is controlled for three variables which 
are exogenous to the latter. For both relationships, we control for a 
possible structural break starting in 1994 (the year in which the crisis 
in Mexico began) 11 and during the crisis of 2008-2009. Likewise, both 
for the IVA and the ISR, we include the respective federal tax rate: 
The maximum rate—currently 16%—for the former and the maximum 
rate which is applied to individuals—currently 30%—for the latter. 
The results appear in Tables 6 and 7.
10. The order of the VEC was chosen through optimization of the information criteria of Akaike, Schwarz 
and Hannan-Quinn. See Appendix A. It is worth emphasizing that the VEC calculations were done with 
the GRETL software package, the code of which is available at
http://dl.dropbox.com/u/1307356/Arxius%20en%20la%20web/LAJE/LAJE%20gretl.gdt
11. It should be mentioned that the inclusion of this change is supported by the results of the GH test, 
which in its full structural change version (see Model 4, “regime shift,” last column of Table 5) detects a 
possible break starting in 1994 in the relationship of both taxes to the GDP. Because the null hypothesis 
could not be ruled out, a cointegration vector without changes was modeled, but the break was included 
as a variable exogenous to the vector. Regarding the 2008-2009 crisis, its effect on the relationship is 
hard to identify as it is practically at the end of the sample, which represents a technical obstacle in 
carrying out the break tests. Nevertheless, its inclusion in the VEC as an exogenous variable assumed 
a significantly better adjustment.
Table 5.  Results of the GH cointegration test  



































Note: Critical values obtained from Gregory-Hansen (1996, p. 109) for the case of two variables 
—with m=1, where m is the number of regressors—based on the ADF statistic. 
† Indicates the acceptance of the null hypothesis—no cointegration—at 1% significance. F.J. Fonseca and D. Ventosa-Santaulària | FEDERAl TAXES IN MEXICo
Table 6.  Results of the Johansen cointegration test for the IVA
No of cointegration equations Trace statistic p-value
None 41.383*** < 0.0001
Up to one 0.727 0.9664
Normalized cointegration equation
DIVA = - + 21 96 2 03
1 65 0 107
. .
( . ) ( . )
GDP
Log-likelihood: 351.77
Vector Error Correction (VEC)
DIVA Tiva DU DU = - -
- -


























= = ∑ ∑ α φ γ i i
i i
IVA PIB D D
DPIB Tiva DU DU = - -
-


























= = ∑ ∑ α φ γ i i
i i
IVA PIB D D
Assessment tests
Autocorrelation test (Ljung-Box with 4 lags):
1. IVA equation: Q = 4.78 with p  -value = P(χ2
4d.f. > 4.78) = 0.31
2. GDP equation: Q = 0.28 with p  -value = P(χ2
4d.f. > 0.28) = 0.99
Homoscedasticity test (ARCH with 4 lags):
1. IVA equation: LM = 4.90954 with p  -value = P(χ2
4d.f. > 4.90954) = 0.296706
2. GDP equation: LM = 1.9903 with p  -value = P(χ2
4d.f. > 1.9903) = 0.737543
Normality test (Doornik-Hansen):
DH = 5.60065 with p  -value: 0.2310 (under the null it is distributed as χ2
4d.f.)
Source: Critical values taken from Doornik (1998).
Note: *** Significant at 1%; standard error in parenthesis, t statistic in brackets; α1 denotes the 
VEC mechanism; Tiva is the maximum IVA rate; DU94 is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 in 
1994:1 hereafter and zero in other cases; DU08 is also a dummy variable equal to 1 of 2008:3 until 
2009:4 and zero in other cases.
What is notable in both cases (IVA and ISR) is that it is possible to 
rule out the null hypothesis of no cointegration with the Johansen test 
in accordance with the trace statistic,
12 but this can’t be done when 
the null hypothesis proven is the existence of at least one cointegration 
vector. Likewise, the results obtained for each tax indicate that these 
12. The same conclusion is reached with the other Johansen statistic, λmáx. 100 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48, No. 1 (MAY, 2011), 89–111
Table 7.  Results of the Johansen cointegration test for the ISR
No of cointegration equations Trace statistic p-value
None 39.17*** < 0.0001
Up to one 2.72 0.6390
Normalized cointegration equation
ISR = - + 22 99 2 16
3 14 0 19
. .
( . ) ( . )
GDP
Log-likelihood: 341.29
Vector Error Correction (VEC)
DISR Tisr DU DU = - +
-






















DPIB Tisr DU DU = - -
-























Autocorrelation test (Ljung-Box with 4 lags):
1. IVA equation: Q = 2.77 with p  -value = P(χ2
4d.f. > 2.77) = 0.60
2. GDP equation: Q = 4.21 with p  -value = P(χ2
4d.f. > 4.21) = 0.38
Homoscedasticity test (ARCH with 4 lags):
1. IVA equation: LM = 7.01 with p  -value = P(χ2
4d.f. > 7.01) = 0.14
2. GDP equation: LM = 4.47 with p  -value = P(χ2
4d.f. > 4.47) = 0.35
Normality test (Doornik-Hansen) 
DH = 7.73 with p-value: 0.10 (under the null it is distributed as χ2
4d.f.)
Source: Critical values taken from Doornik (1998).
Note: *** Significant at 1%; standard errors in parentheses, t statistic in brackets; α2 denotes the 
VEC mechanism; Tisr is the maximum ISR rate for individuals; DU94 is a dummy variable equal 
to1 of 1994:1 hereafter and zero in other cases. DU08 is also a dummy variable equal to 1 of 2008:3 
until 2009:4 and zero in other cases.
are sensitive to growth in national income: For each percentage point 
that this variable increases, collection of IVA and ISR increases, on 
average, around two percentage points (2.08 and 2.16 percentage 
points, respectively).
With respect to the vector error correction (VEC) model, the assessment 
tests exhibit good statistical behavior of the models calculated in 
terms of satisfying the assumptions of homoscedasticity, normality 
and absence of correlation. On the other hand, the results related to 101 F.J. Fonseca and D. Ventosa-Santaulària | FEDERAl TAXES IN MEXICo
the VEC confirm the existence of a cointegration relationship between 
the variables for both taxes. This is inferred based on analysis of the 
signs of the model’s stability parameters. These fulfill the following: 
The parameter associated with the error correction mechanism (α1) 
is negative in the IVA equation (-0.46) and positive (although not 
significant at 5%) in the equation of the GDP (0.01). For the ISR, 
the adjustment coefficient α2 shows the correct sign in the ISR 
equation (-0.56) but the opposite of what is expected in the GDP 
equation. However, the latter is not statistically significant at 5%. 
In both cases, the error correction mechanism only applies (in the 
correct direction) in the tax equation, so it is possible to infer that 
the disequilibrium adjustment process (with respect to the long-term 
ratio), both for the IVA and the ISR, administered through the error 
correction mechanism, falls to the tax variable and not to GDP. In 
other words, given a short-term disequilibrium in the relationship 
between tax and production, the tax is adjusted to correct it, rather 
than production.  This analysis is relevant in that it provides evidence 
of the condition of weak exogeneity of the GDP in relation to both 
taxes (see Engle et al., 1983, and Enders, 2010). 
With weak exogeneity (WE) of the regressor, a very important range 
of potential extensions are opened for the models. Weak exogeneity 
is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for strong exogeneity 
(StE) and for super exogeneity (SuE). With respect to StE, this also 
requires that there is no evidence of Grange causality of the tax 
to the GDP, while SuE requires that all instability in the marginal 
distribution of the GDP not affect the conditional distribution (in 
simple terms, the regression). 
Establishing StE or SuE statistically allows, respectively, for 
obtaining proof that the model is useful in preparing forecasts and 
assessing economic policy without application of the Lucas critique. 
Specifically, one of the objectives of the study is to use the models 
calculated to develop forecasts. By inferring the weak exogeneity 
of the parameter associated with the GDP, all that remains is to 
prove that the assumptions considered do not affect the GDP in the 
Granger sense. The following table shows the result of applying the 
non-causality in the Granger sense between the GDP and the taxes. 
The proof is carried out both in levels and in first differences and 
specifying up to eight lags in the variables. 10 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48, No. 1 (MAY, 2011), 89–111
Table 8.  Results of the Granger causality test
Lags
Levels First differences
IVA→GDP ISR→GDP IVA→GDP ISR→GDP
1 2.10 2.01 3.88* 0.27
2 2.62* 1.41 1.78 0.65
3 1.95 0.90 1.69 0.66
4 1.78 1.32 2.28* 0.70
5 2.19* 1.49 1.61 0.62
6 1.53 1.61 1.02 0.99
7 1.65 1.78 0.79 1.24
8 1.06 1.59 0.82 1.11
* Indicates ruling out of the null hypothesis at 10% significance.
The Granger causality test (GC) presents some problems when it 
is used with nonstationary variables, as in our case. Christiano and 
Ljungqvist (1988) presented Monte Carlo evidence which suggests that 
the test statistic of GC does not exhibit, under the null hypothesis, 
standard behavior so the statistical difference may be invalid (see also 
Sims et al., 1990, and Ventosa-Santaulària and Vera-Valdés, 2008). 
This suggests carrying out the test using the series in first differences. 
There is also a great deal of hesitation among researchers regarding 
this way of proceeding, due to the consideration that the differentiation 
eliminates much of the information contained in the data, rendering 
the test less powerful. Concerning the GC of the taxes to GDP, the 
tests run indicate in almost all cases that there was no evidence of 
this, permitting us to infer that these models constitute a valid basis 
for building forecasts. 
In addition, the unit root tests did not detect structural breaks in 
any of the series either of the taxes or of GDP (see Table 4). In the 
absence of evidence of the existence of such breaks, it is not possible 
to opt either favorably or adversely to the SuE condition. 
3.3.  Comparison of estimates and forecasts
The results above, viewed from a comparative perspective for different 
countries—both developed as well as emerging and/or developing, see 
Table 9—indicate that the revenue elasticity obtained for the ISR is 
greater in Mexico than in any other selected developing economies, 
and in relation to the developed economies, our estimate is only lower 10 F.J. Fonseca and D. Ventosa-Santaulària | FEDERAl TAXES IN MEXICo
than that reported by Giorno et al. (1995) for the United States. In 
terms of the IVA, the estimated elasticity is located slightly above 
the average in developing countries: very similar to Bolivia, but lower 
than Colombia and Guatemala.
With respect to the results obtained by other studies of the Mexican 
case, our estimated elasticity is higher than that of CEFP (2009) and 
Cárdenas et al. (2008 for both the ISR and the IVA, which may be due 
to (i) differences between sample periods used in the cited works and 
the one used here, and (ii) the fact that the tax rate is not controlled 
for in either Cárdenas et al. (2008) or in CEFP (2009). It is worth 
mentioning that the Treasury Secretariat’s estimates are not included 
because they are not published.
Table 9.  Comparison of revenue elasticities in selected 
countries and in the Mexican economy
ISR IVA









United Statese 2.3 -
Japane 1.4 -
Germanye 0.8 -
Results for the Mexican economy








Sources: a. Cited in Cárdenas et al. (2008);b. Fuentes and Tobar (2004); c. Kustepeli and Sapci 
(2006) d. Bilquees (2004); e. Giorno et al. (1995) and authors’ calculations.10 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48, No. 1 (MAY, 2011), 89–111
As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the Treasury Secretariat 
uses tax revenue elasticity to determine the expected collection 
amount for each tax in order to develop a forecast of collection for 
fiscal year 2011. Once the expected amount for each tax is obtained, 
the Treasury Secretariat builds monthly forecasts of the collection 
volume of each tax during the year through the Revenue Estimate 
Calendar for the Public Sector (Calendario de Estimación de Ingresos 
del Sector Público).
13
For these forecasts the Treasury Secretariat does not use the elasticities 
method. Instead, it uses the annual amount obtainedand published 
in the Revenue Law Initiative of the Federation (ILIF) approved by 
Congressapplying statistical models based on exponential smoothing 
to obtain the seasonal factors of each tax (Treasury Secretariat, 2009) 
through the Holt-Winters method (in its additive and multiplicative 
version). To ensure, to the greatest extent possible, the validity of the 
comparison between the taxes forecast by the Treasury Secretariat and 
our forecasts, we omitted the monthly breakdown and concentrated 
on the annual amount in real terms. This eliminates the need to 
reproduce the smoothing of the Treasury Secretariat (which is, in fact, 
impossible, given that the Secretariat does not provide the elements 
needed to do that). What is necessary, however, is to transform the 
amounts forecast by the Treasury Secretariat into real values, which 
was done by using the inflation forecast that appears in the ILIF, 3% 
on a monthly basis as if it were compound interest.
Table 10 shows the results of the Treasury Secretariat calculations 
as well as those calculated here based on the VECs, prepared in 
millions of constant pesos with base year 2003. In both cases the 
2011 macroeconomic scenario forecast in the General Criteria of 
Economic Policy (Criterios Generales de Política Económica, prepared 
by the Secretariat) of 3% expected economic growth as well as annual 
inflation of 3%.
14
As shown in Table 10, our calculations are lower than the official ones 
for the IVA (8.97%) and the ISR (9.88%). The differences between 
them may be due to, among other things, the methodologies used 
to develop them. On the one hand, the Treasury Secretariat uses an 
exponential smoothing method which does not explicitly depend on 
13. This is the same forecast which is published in the Official Gazette of the Federation (Diario Oficial 
de la Federación, or DOF) at the frequency established by the law.
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the growth rate of the economy (since the method extrapolates trends) 
while our forecasts are intimately conditioned by said growth. If the 
3% growth rate is far below what actually occurs in 2011, the forecasts 
derived from our VECs will also be negatively affected. Nevertheless, 
when calculating 5% confidence intervals of our forecasts, it is evident 
that the forecasts of the Treasury Secretariat are included in such 
intervals (see Table 10 and Figures 5 and 6).
Table 10. Estimated tax collection for 2011:
(Treasury Secretariat and authors’ calculations)
ISR IVA
Forecast scenario
Maximum rate 30% 16%
Expected growth 3% 3%
Forecasts
Treasury Secretariat
(millions of constant pesos,   
base year 2003)
$ 491,523.03 $ 396,318.11
Authors’ calculations
(millions of constant pesos, 
 base year 2003)
95 % interval
$ 442,950.52
[$ 384,736.41 – $ 510,154.91]
$ 360,767.72
[$ 324,662.06 – $ 400,950.18]
Source: Treasury Secretariat and authors’ calculations.
Figure 5. ISR collection forecast for 2011
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Figure 6. IVA collection forecast for 2011
 
1.  Conclusions
A tax system which is elastic to revenue reduces the uncertainty 
associated with tax revenue, allowing tax collection to evolve in line 
with growth of the national product. This paper presents calculations of 
the revenue elasticity of the main non-petroleum taxes in the Mexican 
economy: the ISR and the IVA. These two taxes comprise just over 
90% of the taxes collected.
Using macroeconometric modeling supported by Johansen’s 
methodology (1988), it was possible to establish long-term ratios 
between taxes and revenue. In fact, it was found that the variables 
belong to a cointegrated system without structural breaks (within the 
cointegration vector); in other words, they maintain an equilibrium 
relationship over the long term. Once this was done –in accordance 
with Granger’s representation theorem– the vector error correction 
(VEC) model was estimated, which enabled the establishment of 
the error correction mechanism and furthermore, evidence of weak 
exogeneity of the parameter associated with revenue. This, along 
with evidence of Granger causality, made it possible to infer that 
the model constitutes a valid tool for developing forecasts.
The results obtained indicate that the taxes studied are elastic to 
growth in national income, with estimated revenue elasticity in both 
cases of around 2% (2.16 for the ISR and 2.03 for the IVA). Also, 
forecasts were developed based on the estimated VEC to compare 10 F.J. Fonseca and D. Ventosa-Santaulària | FEDERAl TAXES IN MEXICo
them to the scenario proposed by the Treasury Secretariat both in the 
CGPEs as well as the Revenue Law (ILIF) approved in 2011. This is 
particularly valuable once the conditions of weak and strong exogeneity 
were proven in the model used to create the forecasts.10 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48, No. 1 (MAY, 2011), 89–111
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APPENDIX A. Order of the estimated VECs
Through information criteria
AIC: Akaike Information Criterion; BIC: Bayesian information criterion 
(Schwarz); HQC: Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Table A1. ISR
Lag AIC BIC HQC
1 -7.968* -7.595* -7.819*
2 -7.898 -7.400 -7.700
3 -7.865 -7.242 -7.610
4 -7.875 -7.128 -7.577
5 -7.921 -7.050 -7.574
6 -7.831 -6.835 -7.434
7 -7.829 -6.708 -7.380
8 -7.845 -6.600 -7.348
* denotes the minimum value of the criterion.
For the ISR, the three criteria coincide in that only one lag must be 
specified.
Table A2. IVA
Lag AIC BIC HQC
1 -8.383 -8.015* -8.236*
2 -8.375 -7.885 -8.180
3 -8.378 -7.765 -8.133
4 -8.422 -7.68 -8.128
5 -8.503* -7.645 -8.160
6 -8.446 -7.464 -8.053
7 -8.354 -7.250 -7.913
8 -8.334 -7.108 -7.844
* denotes the minimum value of the criterion.
For the IVA, BIC and HQC criteria suggest a specification with a 
single lag; the AIC suggests 5 lags. Given these two options, first a 111 F.J. Fonseca and D. Ventosa-Santaulària | FEDERAl TAXES IN MEXICo
VEC(1) was chosen, but this model does not yield residuals satisfying 
the assumptions. Thus, the decision was made to use VEC(5), because 
its residuals satisfy the assumptions of homoscedasticity, normality 
and independence.
APPENDIX B. Values used in preparing the 
forecasts:






Table B2. CPI: 3% growth rate
Month CPI (base year 2003)
2011.01 138.38
2011.02 138.72
2011.03 139.06
2011.04 139.41
2011.05 139.75
2011.06 140.09
2011.07 140.44
2011.08 140.79
2011.09 141.13
2011.10 141.48
2011.11 141.83
2011.12 142.18